Abstract: A private security contractor for business and government, Allan Pinkerton acted centrally in early chapters of the history of the security state. The operative and the report, Pinkerton's principal surveillance technologies, are analyzed here in relation to each other and in their historical development as information technology, drawing on Pinkerton's fictionalized accounts of cases, secret reports, and other agency documents. Pinkerton management was consistently preoccupied with strict compliance of operatives, their deployment in a network, and the regular submission of reports. This study suggests that information can lead to uncertainty and that the surveillance state was and is compartmentalized, entrepreneurial, and other-than-public.
While on a whistle-stop tour following his inauguration in 1861, Abraham Lincoln was briefed by Kate Warne, head of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency's female detectives, about a plot to assassinate him in Baltimore. Allan Pinkerton, however, had a plan to ensure Lincoln's safety. The president-elect, guarded personally by Pinkerton, raced through Baltimore on an unscheduled, nondescript, and private train straight from Philadelphia to Washington at midnight. Pinkerton operatives sabotaged telegraph lines out of Philadelphia and were stationed along the train's route to ensure safe passage. Finally, members of the press who were traveling with Lincoln were held in Philadelphia at gunpoint by another Pinkerton operative, who briefed them on all these efforts. 1 
Alan Bilansky holds a PhD in rhetoric and democracy from Penn State and an MSLIS from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he consults with faculty about technology and occasionally teaches informatics. He is currently at work on a book examining the information practices of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency.
This story is significant for three reasons. First, before this event, Pinkerton was a private security contractor known to law enforcement and capitalists; afterward, he became a household name. Second, foiling the plot required mastery of multiple networks. Pinkerton first learned of the plot because his agency was working on security for the Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, as sabotage to the tracks was reportedly part of this plot. Pinkerton's own network of agents made easy work of infiltrating the Copperhead terrorist cell, since gaining the confidence of lowerlevel players led quickly to gaining the trust of leaders. Finally, he was also able to commandeer the railroads and telegraph lines to change the facts on the ground and outwit the terrorists. As Regina Schober has argued, the concept of network has been a crucial ideological formation as a metaphor for the American state and for the expanding nation itself. 2 A source of Pinkerton's success was his understanding of networks, how they are built, and how they could be exploited.
The third reason to start here is that Pinkerton would spend the rest of his life defending himself against claims that the whole thing was a hoax. For example, Chicago mayor John Wentworth wrote an editorial claiming exactly that, and the two men had a fistfight on a Chicago street over it. 3 Moreover, this early controversy contributed to the launch of a literary career. 4 The first book Pinkerton published was a collection of testimonials about the Baltimore plot. It was followed by eighteen novels and various shorter pieces between 1875 and 1884, covering exploits of his agency between 1851 and 1880. 5 The novels had titles like The Mollie Maguires and the Detectives, The Gypsies and the Detectives, The Professional Thieves and the Detectives, and Strikers, Communists, Tramps, and Detectives. To state the obvious, spies have always dealt in secrets, but Pinkerton was very public, spectacular even, about his spying. Espionage, as Timothy Melley shows in the Cold War era, is always a literary enterprise. 6 This article draws on-and tells the story of-two families of documents: Pinkerton's public accounts of his agency's work and the secret reports and other agency papers. My focus here is on the principal nodes in Pinkerton's surveillance network, the operatives, and the central technology of the agency, the report. Along the way, tensions emerge between the representations found in public and private documents.
Studies of the national security state and its information collection practices have tended to begin with the 1947 passage of the National Security Act. 7 For the most part, historiography of the security state tends to fixate on recognizable institutions and technologies of surveillance; thus, anything before telephony, the FBI, and the Cold War tends to be treated as prehistory. This is not surprising; as James Cortada notes, the volume of data collection through federal security agencies surged in volume beginning at this time. 8 While the volume of information gathering and the mix of public and private changed and new institutions were formed within the federal government, information collection for the purposes of national security and law enforcement predate World War II. In the nineteenth century, more of the work was done by private contractors, including, as we have seen, work that today would be the province of the Secret Service. Although Pinkerton quickly became the preeminent and most famous private security contractor in the United States, he had several competitors, all of whom seem to appear at the same moment in history, before the Civil War. We might point to several reasons for the rise of the detective agency, such as urbanization, the growth of the bureaucratic state, and the lack of a law enforcement agency that could operate outside a single jurisdiction, but the best explanation might be the rise of the corporation and the rise of workplace surveillance and corporate security. This trend is reflected in Pinkerton's rise, the bulk of his clients, and the work most of his operatives did: tracking embezzlement, providing security for railroads, working as night watchmen, and so on. It is also reflected, most significantly, in his use of reports, an information practice he adapted from a form of workplace surveillance his clients used. There are countless examples of spies before Pinkerton's moment, as far back as the ancient world. In his speeches against Cataline, Cicero brags about spies he employs (employed by him, not the state, but for the good of the republic), who warn him of Cataline's every move. Pinkerton's use of reports suggests a historical transition from the ad hoc methods of earlier spies and informants to the institutional practices of the corporation and modern nation-state, and these reports serve as a source and a subject of this article. Throughout the agency's history, management was preoccupied with strict compliance of operatives, their deployment in a network, and the regular submission of reports.
Before he had even started an agency, Pinkerton posed as a mail clerk to catch other clerks robbing the mail. This deception became his primary-practically his only-method. To determine whether railroad conductors were pocketing fares, Pinkerton would place multiple operatives in the guise of employees and customers who could watch employees and each other. This inductive procedure, which he called "testing," became his standard method for finding abuses in the workplace like embezzlement and fraud. Testing conductors led to the first prosecution for embezzlement and in fact led to the invention of the crime, as Pinkerton's first target was prosecuted before "embezzlement" was codified. 9 Pinkerton agents did not act as detectives in the manner of Sherlock Holmes or Sam Spade. They were called "operatives," a contemporary industrial term referring to workers who operate machinery or otherwise carry out clearly defined procedures; the term categorized these workers in opposition to the ethos of professionalism associated with skilled artisans. Definitions of both terms, "testing" and "operative," are provided in the agency's manual for testing train conductors:
It is possible that no class of men, upon whom the agency is to operate, are more on their guard, or in expectation of being watched, than are Railroad Conductors. In operating upon, or "Testing" them, the efficiency of the Operative depends greatly upon his being entirely unobserved and unnoticed, and, as an operation of this kind generally occupies a period of several months-bringing the Operatives thereon engaged much in connection with those upon whom they are operating, it is deemed necessary, in order to secure success, that the following Rules and Requirements of the Agency, be strictly and implicitly complied with. 10 The rest of the pamphlet is a list of these "Rules and Requirements," clearly indicating a need to control every aspect of the operatives' behavior. Rule 3 states that instructions (e.g., which car and which seat to occupy, etc.) are to be followed to the letter, and all deviations must be accounted for. The rules cover both what to do and what not to do: rule 4 instructs operatives to secretly make notes immediately after leaving the train, while rules 5 through 9 cover procedures to avoid notice. Rule 10 says, "The Operatives are positively forbidden from giving any information . . . to each other." Rules 11 through 16 cover what to watch for and precise requirements about the content and format of operatives' reports.
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The thoroughgoing efforts to control operatives in every way were not limited to testing conductors or to the testing manual. Pinkerton published a more general manual for training operatives, titled General Principles of Pinkerton's National Police Agency, for his agents and apparently for public consumption, affirming the value of full and honest reporting by operatives. 12 This manual went through several revised editions as Pinkerton's sons took on responsibility for the agency after their father withdrew from active control of the agency in the 1870s and then died in 1884. In some ways, the changes made over time might suggest a shift in emphasis of control. On the one hand, the strong prohibitions against consuming alcohol and against the adage "it takes a thief to catch a thief" (in other words, hiring criminals) were removed. On the other hand, Pinkerton's sons added regulations to make more explicit (and perhaps more complete) the control over operatives' reporting procedures. Multiple rules for the content and submission of reports were revived from the testing manual and added to later editions of General Principles. When the publication was replaced by entirely internal training materials, instructions for the preparation of reports were included along with techniques such as pretexting, roping, and how to bypass an alarm.
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In 1867, when testing train conductors was still the bulk of Allan Pinkerton's business, the agency published a pamphlet aimed at executives of railroads that had not yet hired the agency, aggregating the results of tests conducted on the railroads that had. 14 The individual reports of Pinkerton's operatives were aggregated to tabular data. 15 This marshaling of evidence to demonstrate a threat to capital could have drawn on Pinkerton's Civil War experience estimating the Confederate threat, when he ran a "secret service" for Gen. George B. McClellan. 16 The pamphlet painted a clear picture of money draining away through embezzlement, mile after mile, and argued for the monetary value of surveillance. In the British context, Toni Weller notes that surveillance and the monetization of information, perhaps for its own sake, were a mania for the Victorians. 17 We see an impressive example of the same drive here. Pinkerton presented the data but anonymized his clients. One railroad was named in the pamphlet, the Wilmington and Baltimore. (This is also the railroad that the agency was working for when the Baltimore plot was discovered and that provided the unscheduled train for Lincoln's quick detour.) We can assume that the company consented to be named, suggesting a hand-in-glove relationship between the agency and the client.
Each row of the table shown in figure 1 represents a single stint by a conductor and at least one operative watching him. The individual theft is placed in the immediate context of losses per mile of that particular route and in the context of the railroad network. In addition, in this case the publication provides average figures for before and after the introduction of Pinkerton operatives. The sample shown in the figure is followed by thirty pages of testing runs of railroads, table after table of them.
The use of reports was central to a newly developed management technique used by railroads and other companies that were Pinkerton's clients. Allan Pinkerton eagerly adopted this practice. Of course, bureaucratic reports were not invented in the nineteenth century. Markus Friedrich discusses the flow of information through the Jesuit hierarchy, for example, and how the reports were used to inform decision making and to influence leadership. 18 But there is a difference at the moment in question. The trend that A. D. Chandler identifies in nineteenth-century American corporations is the use of daily reports designed to make everyday business operations the subject of surveillance. Ground-level employees produced daily reports, which were read, analyzed, and condensed as they moved up the firm's hierarchy, and, in the case of the railroads and other companies, this process led to mastery or something resembling omniscience at the top. 19 This agency practice may have started as imitation of Pinkerton's clients, applied slavishly and insistently, until it came to define his very agency.
Pinkerton's efforts at workplace surveillance anticipate what Shoshana Zuboff calls "surveillance capitalism." Under this regime, a "'division of learning' becomes more salient than the traditional division of labor." 20 Thus Pinkerton's operatives were expected to act inductively and accumulate a mass of surveillance data. Only as the reports passed through layers of managers or the clients was there a space in which to form a narrative that made sense of the raw data. We see this process happening here as the efforts of individual operatives and their reports are extracted, abstracted, and aggregated into tables, resulting in a narrative of massive theft and threat to railroad profits.
The use of reports has received some attention in the history of management, but they also deserve attention as an information practice and an information technology. In Lisa Gitelman's history of blank books of forms used by bureaucracy, such as ledgers and reports, she describes them as "meta-micro-genres, one might say, documents establishing the parameters of the rules for entries to be made individually in pencil or ink."
21 She says, further, "The labor of filling [in blanks] was divided from the labor of planning what filling was for and directing how filling should happen: a 'managerial revolution' wrought in miniature and avant la lettre."
22 Gitelman gives the printed forms too much credit here. The artifacts Gitelman studies are records of a cultural process prior to them both chronologically and analytically. Printed forms acted as assistive technologies, ensuring compliance with genres that existed prior to the printing. They made bureaucrats easier to inspect. This division of labor and what Zuboff calls an attending "division of learning" happened conceptually and chronologically prior to the printing of forms, when an employer like a railroad hired some employees (operatives) to watch other employees (conductors) and a contractor (Pinkerton) told them how to prepare reports.
Mastery of the technologies of writing was an essential skill for Pinkerton's operatives. James McParland, Pinkerton's most famous agent, started in an entry-level job for the agency, posing as a streetcar conductor as part of a test to determine whether conductors were pocketing some of the fares they collected. Pinkerton selected him for one of his most high profile cases: the infiltration of the Molly Maguires, a sort of protection racket associated with ethnic Irish Catholic labor organizing in Pennsylvania's anthracite coal region. The organization was targeted by industrialist (and Pinkerton client) Franklin Gowen after the Civil War. When Pinkerton interviewed McParland for the job of infiltrating the Molly Maguires, he assigned him an essay to write, a report on everything he knew about that secret organization, due first thing the next morning. McParland's report was largely inaccurate, inflammatory, and ideological and was based on the unrelated organization of the same name in Ireland. Nonetheless, McParland produced seven pages in small handwriting, a fact that Pinkerton reported as an important piece of evidence convincing him that McParland was the man for the job. 23 Pinkerton's thinking in selecting McParland also turns our attention to the importance of ethnic background, putative authenticity, and ethnic stereotypes in the selection of operatives. In the memoir covering this case, The Molly Maguires and the Detectives, Pinkerton described McParland's physical characteristics and revealed his character. He is depicted as representing all the virtues but none of the vices of the Irish "race." 24 This attention to the ethnic qualities of the operative resonates with Simone Browne's discussion of the contemporary caricature of the "black and sassy" Transportation Security Administration (TSA) worker (many TSA workers are black and female). Browne sees this stereotype as ironic, because black women have unequal access to what TSA protects: they are themselves disproportionately targeted by TSA for invasive searches but disproportionately found not to be carrying contraband. Thus as a racial group they are both instrument and object of state power. 25 Similarly, McParland worked for a regime that considered him a racial other. In Pinkerton's own account, we see McParland denied service by businesses because of his Irish identity (his looks). He even suffers a beating at the hands of police who see him as a ready victim.
As a surveillance node, McParland's visible body was a constant point of vulnerability. The Molly Maguires and the Detectives offers a thorough account of how reports from operatives, the novel's source material for all public accounts, were produced. These reports were "compulsory," even when they put the operative at risk: "It seemed especially necessary that his correspondence should not be discovered, or even imagined. . . . Men have been murdered from the mere suspicion that they might be guilty of acting as detectives, in Ireland, and the same spirit pervaded the ranks of the Mollie Maguires here-hence matters calculated to excite surmise must be deeply buried." 26 As he infiltrated the Mollies, McParland's fellow lodgers "seldom wrote anything," and the family with which he boarded for a time "was not literary."
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The Molly Maguires and the Detectives offers a detailed account of McParland's tradecraft. He experimented with pencils, but the result was illegible, so he preferred pens, but a supply of ink was a constant struggle. The fact that ink would often freeze in his bedroom reflects the living conditions of the communities he infiltrated. He sometimes used his landlady's laundry bluing as a substitute for ink. Often he did not have a bedroom to himself, so he sometimes wrote his reports by the light of a miner's head lamp in the kitchen of a boardinghouse very late at night. He would sometimes rent a hotel room in a nearby town and travel there at night just to write reports. When he did have a room to himself, he hung a hat on the inside doorknob so that a curious lodger out in the hall could not peek through the keyhole. He also posted his letters in the middle of the night. He kept stamps hidden in a secret compartment in his boot. 28 Daily reports meant the operative was subject to surveillance from two directions. As is clear from the above, constant letter writing meant operatives had to constantly evade the surveillance of the community members they spied on. At the same time, the "compulsory" letter writing made the operative the subject of surveillance by agency management and clients. In ex-Pinkerton Dashiell Hammett's novel Red Harvest, an operative of a fictionalized Pinkerton's Detective Agency begins to follow his own agenda, neglects to file regular reports, and knows this will make the agency suspicious. 29 This sort of writing, every night, after an exhausting day, did not allow for reflection or analysis. There was no deliberative space to evaluate threats, qualify sources, weigh evidence, combine threads, reach conclusions, or make arguments of any sort. So who was analyzing and reaching conclusions? Is there evidence of a hierarchical network with an intelligence at the top?
In the public, fictionalized version of the agency found in Pinkerton's novels, we constantly see him filling the role of the coordinating center of his network. Allan Pinkerton himself is always the central character in his novels, even though he seldom acts. He reads reports, cogitates, and issues orders. He narrativizes the past and future, assembling the facts from his operatives into a theory of the crime being investigated and issuing orders to operatives to construct plans so that his operatives and his targets play roles in plays he has composed. In The Detective and the Somnambulist, for example, three operatives spend weeks of effort driving a suspected murderer to the point of confession. Pinkerton, personally reading the reports, decides when the time is right and races to the scene, arriving triumphantly to personally hear the confession. 30 The picture that emerges from the reports that still exist casts doubt on this vision of Allan Pinkerton as the central processing unit of his agency's analytics. Virtually all the extant reports, consisting of the typed reports of operatives wrapped in a letter from a branch manager, were passed on to clients without comment. 31 In most cases, the letter from a Pinkerton manager added nothing to the typed reports beyond a salutation (see figure 2) . The reports provided clients with raw intelligence data, not analysis or conclusions. A common genre of report is simply a list of names of employees who attended a meeting. Sometimes these employees would then be fired with no explanation, just as today one might find oneself on a no-fly list with no explanation. Other correspondence tends to focus on the mechanics of selecting operatives for particular clients, tradecraft to ensure secrecy, precise instructions for operatives, even the specific physical characteristics of the operatives to be assigned. The reports, it seems, were mostly assumed to speak for themselves.
One set of reports I have found interesting, partly because we can see the routing of the reports through a bureaucracy, is from operatives working in mining towns around Scranton, Pennsylvania, at the time of the Great Railroad Strike of 1877. The treatment of these reports by agency management is an exception to the general pattern of minimal engagement by management with operative reporting. 32 These reports really do make for interesting reading, offering a kind of analysis found in early sociology and ethnography. Only later, in the twentieth century, do many of the reports profile individuals. Most of these early reports focus on communities such as a workplace or a company town. Pinkerton agents were conducting ethnographies of working-class communities at the same time Jane Addams was studying working-class communities in Chicago. While Pinkerton's published accounts depict the investigations as focusing on drilling into criminal conspiracies, it is clear from these reports that the operatives were concentrating on union activity and strike preparation. Their reports are fragmentary but fascinating, naming which community members seemed to carry the most weight, reporting opinions of how long workers would stay out on strike, detailing which businesses were contributing to strike pantries, and describing how one operative had his cover blown and fled.
This last incident is the subject of one of the more interesting individual reports I encountered, one that only confirms the genre. Operative T.H.G. describes the day of 17 November 1877. He narrates that he went to work at his cover job, speculates that his letter of reference for employment might be what raised suspicion, and then says, "In the evening John Roach went into Casey's Tavern and told everyone there that I was a detective." T.H.G. was then told that "a crowd of men . . . would take great pleasure in seeing me strung up." After reporting that he immediately caught a train back to Philadelphia and speculating that this probably ends his assignment, he closes the report by noting that he corrects the misspelling of some names in his last report. Even though this is a rare report of an operative who is the hero in the story, it is written to look as much like the others as possible. The single sentence of speculation as to how his cover was blown is one of the clearest examples of analysis I have found, while the corrected spellings reflect the agency's avowed commitment to factual accuracy. But most notable is that the report outlines the operative's entire day. This thoroughness is found in every report, as a primary function of the document is to account for the operative's time and confirm his adherence to the assignment. These reports are themselves a form of workplace surveillance, a way of keeping tabs on the operative himself.
Probably what the agency considered most noteworthy in this set of reports were two finds: a description of the signs and countersigns of the Molly Maguires and of the rituals and ceremonies that took place at a meeting (this report does not match at all how meetings are described in Pinkerton's novel The Molly Maguires); and a secondhand account of prosecutable crimes that occurred during a riot. Like all reports, these were first written by operatives in letters sent to the nearest Pinkerton office, Philadelphia in this case, where they were typed and reviewed by the director of the Philadelphia branch. These reports include a cover memo from the director of the Philadelphia office, Benjamin Franklin, and another from general manager George Bangs. Then, probably because of their particularly sensitive material, the reports were sent to Allan Pinkerton himself in Chicago so that he could associate himself with the intelligence: "In serious matters of this kind it is of course my imperative duty to give your client timely intimations of the dangers that surround him. You must in return insist on absolute silence. You must not convey one word in this Report to any other person than your client, for any breach of confidence on your part or his might imperil the lives of my operatives, expose the investigation and defeat the ends of justice." 33 Here we see Pinkerton inserting himself into the investigation in a rather literary way (see figure 3) . There is not much analysis here. Pinkerton's note does not so much analyze the intelligence as brand it. One can imagine branch managers being told to watch for reports that were interesting enough to be marked with Pinkerton's own signature. In the agency's correspondence with clients and routing of information, we see a clear pattern of compartmentalization of data collection, research questions, and reporting and no time or space for analysis. The reports seem intended to feed into the information flows of the corporations employing Pinkerton's agency rather than to be digested and analyzed within the agency itself. The production of information is fractured by design, and narratives cannot be other than incomplete. The entire process is dominated by the twin imperatives of secrecy and the hoarding of information.
Another sort of uncertainty is that this history makes us uncertain about the category of the surveillance state itself. Two things we learn from Allan Pinkerton's career are the story of the rise of the American surveillance state and just how problematic the category of "state" is in this context. In 1875, for example, when the Workingmen's Benevolent Association, a miners' union, settled the Long Strike by accepting a 20 percent pay cut, Franklin Gowen, president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, had more in store for them. For two years he had Pinkerton operatives, most notably James McParland, infiltrating the miners' communities and building a case against the Molly Maguires. When the strike was settled Gowen had the Pinkertons ready to implicate union leadership in a criminal conspiracy, his own Coal and Iron Police arrested the suspects, and he volunteered to act as prosecutor. Aside from the construction of the gallows, all of what we might call "state action" was conducted by private actors.
Blurring the lines further, Pinkerton's early work as a detective for local and federal law enforcement was as a contractor. This was common practice, better established than public police at the time. In fact, Mayor Wentworth's editorial and the fistfight after the story of the Baltimore plot broke were part of a longer argument, in which Pinkerton was involved, going back more than a decade, with Wentworth arguing for a public option in law enforcement, "the Independents" in competition with "Public police." 34 And James McParland's first job in Chicago was as a private policeman for another detective agency. Pinkerton's methods were developed as private workplace surveillance. Likewise, his work for General McClellan, running a network of spies in the Confederacy as the "secret service," was really as a private contractor.
There were, of course, many spies employed by military and civilian entities, each with their own mandates and reporting lines, with varying degrees of legitimacy, secrecy, and notoriety. Allan Pinkerton is generally credited as the first to form an intelligence service for the federal government, and this is true, but only by a few months. McClellan commissioned Pinkerton in July 1861 to form a "secret service." 35 He ran a spy network in the South during the Civil War and produced threat assessments for the general, grossly overstating Confederate strength and arguing against committing the Army of the Potomac. 36 carried out, as it is now, by multiple government agencies guided by administrative fiat. This fragmentation is not unlike the situation today, when surveillance is carried out by various state and corporate entities. Questions asked and information produced are state secrets or proprietary, and these efforts are so fragmented that it is easy to see how ambiguity can be multiplied rather than reduced.
To move toward a conclusion we can ask: What is at stake here? Claude Shannon's foundational definition of information is that it functions to reduce uncertainty. 38 Engaging the history of Pinkerton's agency suggests that information can be produced and aggregated while uncertainty increases. Another Pinkerton case illustrates this point nicely. In the case recounted in The Detective and the Somnambulist, a bank teller is murdered while working late in the bank, leaving a bloody scene to be discovered the next morning. Pinkerton personally examined the scene and, based on circumstantial evidence, declared he had found the killer, a local planter. He determined, however, that no sheriff would ever arrest the planter on such a basis, so Pinkerton concocted an elaborate plan. One female Pinkerton agent became a close friend of the planter's wife, staying in their home, where the agent could plant evidence trails of blood to and from the suspect's bed. Another agent quickly became the planter's close friend and habitually invited him on nighttime horseback rides, during which a third agent, who looked a good deal like the murder victim, would appear, made up to look like his head had been bashed in. Perhaps out of a guilty conscience, perhaps merely driven mad by these apparently supernatural visions, the planter eventually confessed to the murder, and when asked by Pinkerton how he came to commit the murder, he replied, "I can't tell. . . . [I]t all occurred like a dream." 39 According to the novelized version of the case, he then immediately shot himself. Reviewers of the novels called Pinkerton's methods cruel. The point here is that his investigation is barely worthy of the name and profoundly calls the guilt of his target into question, as the methods used might cause an innocent person to believe he was guilty. Likewise, the spectacular success of foiling the Baltimore plot to assassinate Lincoln could obscure the fact that there is no confirmation of a single particular of the plot outside of Pinkerton's word. No one was arrested in connection with it, let alone charged with any crime. Pinkerton dealt in information, of course, but he was also comfortable with uncertainty.
To return to the effort to uncover the Baltimore plot with which we began, the investigation started as private security work for the Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, and in the end Pinkerton refunded half the money he was paid for the job. Sabotage to rail lines was a significant part of the plot, at least as important as the assassination plot itself, but from Pinkerton's perspective, Lincoln became the client when the information produced was reported to him before the railroad, so the retasked investigation was redefined as a public service.
Thus the information Pinkerton produced was always relative to the client. Spying starts with specific questions for specific clients, conceived in secret, leading to assignments of operatives from which they are not expected to deviate. The information produced is expected to remain secret; even as it accumulates, the information will be held discrete. A common term in intelligence is "compartmentalized information," meaning restricting information to only those members of an organization with a need to know, thus holding information both discreet and discrete. To resort to the parable of the three blind men who examine an elephant and conclude that it is a snake and a tree trunk and a wall, the raw intelligence they produce is accurate in terms of reporting sense data, but that intelligence is fractured, and the blind men's conclusions are therefore suspect. They could collect as much information as in Amazon's database, but it will be inherently flawed because it is fractured. That is, as more information is aggregated, the ultimate result might be a complete picture of reality, or it might only result in a bigger collection of fractured information, but with the prestige of a massive collection. Information produced through surveillance, even assuming it is all true, is fragmented and fractured in multiple ways; therefore, conclusions are always suspect.
One of the most pointed examples of the ambiguity and potential irrationality of the putatively rationalized production of information is the Pinkerton agency's kidnapping and rendition business. District attorneys who did not want to deal with extradition hired agency operatives to seize defendants and witnesses, perhaps coerce confessions, and deliver witnesses to the district attorneys' jurisdictions. When Pinkerton's agency did not make enough effort to massage relations with the local authorities, arrests of operatives occasionally ensued for offenses including kidnapping, assault, and intimidation. Working with the state but not in public and without accountability to the public led to these kinds of ambiguities and inefficiencies, as well as to a disparity between public and state perceptions of reality. The post-World War II security state as described by Timothy Melley and others, fractured and unknowable and wrapped in fictions literary and otherwise, has its analogue in the nineteenth century. The surveillance state, whether by the name of the Secret Service, Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, the NSA, or Google, is always compartmentalized, entrepreneurial, and other-than-public.
